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Stem Cell Research, Cloning 
And Catholic Moral Theology 
by 
Most Reverend Ronald Fabbro, 
Bishop of London, Canada 
This paper was presented at the 4th Annual Connie Heng Memorial 
Lecture in Bioethics, 2004, at the University of St. Michael's College, 
University of Toronto, Canada. 
I. The Bishop as Pastor and as Theologian 
I am sure that you are well aware of the controversy in the United States as 
to whether politicians who profess to be Catholic, yet support abortion as a 
reproductive right of women, should be refused Holy Communion. 
Let's leave aside the question of refusal of Holy Communion and ask 
about the actions of the politicians in question. It would seem to me that 
these politicians who disagree fundamentally and publicly with the clear 
and traditional teaching of the Church on so important a matter put 
themselves outside the community of the faithful. The claim to be Catholic 
and a supporter of abortion is a contradiction in terms. This is true of all 
those who claim to belong to the community of faith, whether they be 
bishops, laypeople, persons in public life or private citizeRs. 
I am not referring here to the position proposed by Mario Cuomo, 
when he was Governor of New York, that he was personally against 
abortion, but as a politician had to accede to the will of the people in a 
pluralistic, democratic society. This position, adopted as political 
stratagem by many politicians, is untenable, I believe, but it does not show 
an out-and-out support of abortion in itself. 
When a politician declares his support for abortion, and claims to be 
a devout Catholic, scandal is caused. The bishop is called upon to correct 
those who are in error and to ensure that the faithful know and understand 
the Church's teaching on abortion. He is to instruct Catholic politicians, so 
that they might have a correctly formed conscience. The bishop is a pastor, 
a teacher of the faith. 
In his post-synodal apostolic exhortation Pastores Gregis, Pope John 
Paul II made reference to the bishop's mission to teach. He says that the 
bishop's word "strengthens the community of faith, gathers it around the 
294 Linacre Quarterly 
mystery of God and gives it life" (n.29). The pope points out that in this 
task the bishop benefits from open dialogue and cooperation with 
theologians. The theologian's role is to be attentive to the changing 
historical circumstances, to study them in the light of the gospel message 
and the teachings of the Church (n. 29). In moral matters, the bishop 
consults and dialogues with moral theologians, as he attempts to lead the 
faithful to right action. 
In this paper, I refer to the work of moral theologians, as well as 
scientists. I am grateful to the Canadian Catholic Bioethics Institute for 
providing me with a thorough explanation of the latest scientific 
discoveries concerning stem cell research and cloning. 
There are two different sources of human stem cells, those taken 
from an embryo, and adult stem cells. The Church is not opposed to adult 
stem cell research. Studies have already shown that there are important 
advantages in using adult stem cells for therapies. 
The Church is opposed to research which uses human embryonic 
stem cells because of the means used. In the process of isolating these 
cells, the ongoing development of the embryo is arrested, that is, it dies. In 
light of Catholic teaching about the dignity of the human person from the 
time of conception until natural death, this procedure is immoral. It is 
important, then, to examine ethical questions involving the ontological 
status of the human embryo. 
II. Ethical Questions Involving the Ontological Status 
of the Human Embryo 
In 1974, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith said that the 
matter of whether there is a human person present from the completion of 
the fertilization process is not a matter that has been proved 
philosophically. However, since what is present is probably a human 
person, then the embryo has to be treated as a person from conception. 
Some have argued that the Church itself is unsure. I think that this is not the 
case at all. What the Church seems to have been aware of is that endless 
philosophical argumentation about the status of the embryo would get us 
nowhere. And in the meantime, human persons would continue to be 
killed. Therefore, the Church cut the Gordian Knot, as it were, and used 
another argument based on the solid probability that we have here a human 
person, and therefore we have to treat that entity as a human person. 
If you want a good philosophical argument about the personal status 
of the embryo, then I would refer you to a monograph by Fr. Jack 
Gallagher. Fr. Gallagher argues this way: We are our bodies; we are our 
organisms. When a new person comes to be, then a new organism has to 
begin to exist. The principle of economy states that we should not employ 
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fanciful explanations of events when a straightforward explanation is 
present. Now we know that we have a new organism when the ovum is 
fertilized by the sperm. We also know that the organism at birth is a person, 
a baby. There is no evidence that a new organism came into being from the 
time of conception to birth. Therefore, according to the principle of 
economy, the same organism is present throughout. 
In any case, the Church has been clear in several important moral 
documents after 1974 that the embryo is a person. See especially Donum 
Vitae (1987) and Evangelium Vitae (1995). 
A. Responses to the Church's Position 
Different responses have been given to the Church's position. Some 
arguments rest on denying personal status to the embryo. Many feel that the 
embryo is worthy of respect, but that respect does not override the usefulness 
of embryonic research in pursuit of cures for some of the more serious 
illnesses that beset humankind. The possible benefits to others justify the 
destruction of the embryo. This argument in favor of embryonic research is 
by far the most common. It seems to be virtually impossible for many people 
to hold that a tiny embryo is of the same worth as, say, an adult human. The 
benefits to what they see as an existing human far outweigh any harm done 
to such a tiny entity. Obviously, for such people the embryo is not a person. 
A similar argument claims that only "spare" embryos will be used 
and that, surely, cannot be a problem for anybody, since they will die 
anyway. Indeed, in many ways, we are thereby ensuring that the embryos 
are not wasted or simply discarded. It is as if we are almost doing these 
embryos a favor by at least "using" them. This argument, too, has great 
popular appeal. Just recently, a senior researcher from the University of 
Toronto wrote an article for the U. ofT. Bulletin (August.23, 2004) saying 
that almost all existing human stem cell lines were derived from human 
embryos obtained with the informed consent from the donors undergoing 
in vitro fertilization. During that procedure, women are given hormones 
that lead to the production of a large number of eggs. The eggs are then 
fertilized and "the best" are put into the uterus. The "next best" are frozen 
for future reproductive purposes and the rest are discarded. Of those that 
are kept, the suggestion is that they should be used for embryonic research. 
The researcher then uses language which goes to the heart of the debate 
over embryonic personhood. She states: "Opponents of the use of stem cell 
research argue that any human embryo has the potential to be a human 
and so deserves protection from destruction. Realistically, however, these 
embryos are being discarded and destroyed in IVF programs all the time." 
A minor point that she makes is that people who are against embryonic 
research are being unrealistic. The major point, though, is her reference to 
the embryo as "having potential to be a human." 
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Concerning "potential," it is important to emphasize that we all 
undoubtedly have potential for development in all sorts of areas. The 
embryo has, too. However, just as we remain who we are through the 
actualizing of potential, so does the embryo. It does not have the potential 
to become human. It is human by virtue of its very existence. It is truly 
amazing how often we read misleading statements by researchers still. 
A further example of this argumentation is found in an article 
published in the Globe and Mail (August 2004), in which the Director of 
the Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics refers to the embryo as "a clump of 
cells". Technically this is true but we all could be said, in one rather 
reductionist way, to be a clump of cells, but the point is that the author did 
not ever refer to the embryo as a human being. Here, there are shades of the 
earlier abortion debates, when one side talked of "a potential human being" 
and the other side insisted on discussing "human being with potential." It is 
surprising that these techniques of description still continue. It is probably 
also surprising that many people are not alert to the hidden dangers of this 
type of discussion of embryos, since most of us are not particularly well 
versed in this relatively new science. 
Relevant to this is a warning issued by Dr. Claudia Navarini of the 
School of Bioethics at the Regina Apostolorum Pontifical University in 
Rome, noting that there has been what she terms "a resurfacing of false 
terms in public discourse." In this case it is the use of the term "pre-
embryo", which had been used in the 1980s and 1990s as a way of 
conveying the impression that up until a certain stage of development after 
conception there is "only" a "pre-embryo." The implications were that 
research and experimentation could be done on this pre-embryo, since it 
had not quite reached the "human" stage. The term was also used in the 
United Kingdom in the Warnock Commission, which tlea1t with human 
experimentation and assisted techniques of human reproduction, and also 
the Ethical Committee of the American Society for Fertility. The scientific 
community continued to use this terminology, based largely on the coming 
into existence, at about the fourteenth day of development, of the 
"primitive streak", the manifestation of a neural organizing capacity. After 
its "appearance", the existing stem cells lose their totipotential capacity 
and become differentiated. Much scientific discussion resulted in the more 
or less universal conclusion that, as Professor Navarini puts it: 
In reality, biological research itself has established with certainty that 
such "progress" in embryonic development does not represent 
substantial novelties, but is part of the uninterrupted evolution of the 
organism from the first instant, fertilization, until the last, the 
person 's death. 
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Her point is important for the present discussion on stem cells, since 
calling the embryo "a potential human", "a clump of cells", or a "pre-
embryo" is again to raise the spectre of murky unscientific language in an 
arena where scientific as well as ethical clarity are of utmost importance. 
We have to remember that, as Professor Navarini also advises us: 
From the fertilization and after, the human being has some fixed 
biological propelties: coordination - namely the fact of presenting a 
functionally organized unit according to an established object and 
autonomously pursued by the organism's genetic programme: 
gradualness - namely, the progressive constitution through different 
phases of development of the final form of an individual, according 
to hislher own identity, individuaLity and uniqueness. 
Until recently, this was adopted by most members of the scientific 
community, yet of late some inaccurate terminology has reappeared, which 
seems to be less biologically structured than culturally and politically driven. 
Professor Navarini does not mince words. She claims that "we are 
before a great and conscious lie." For those of us who are accustomed to 
being on the alert in these areas, we may consider ourselves warned that 
the war of words will continue, with important consequences in terms of 
persuading the public, and subsequent legislation. 
In fact, the horse has already bolted in Canada. Legislation has been 
passed recently that will regulate all forms of reproductive technology and 
human embryo research. Scientists may apply for a license to do research 
with human embryos. They will be allowed to do research on so-called 
"spare" embryos if it has clear benefit for future human health. The 
legislation bans the creation of embryos solely for rese~rch purposes, as 
well as the creation of embryos by somatic cell transfer (that is, cloning) 
for any purpose. Interestingly, the legislation has a clause which allows for 
the possible revision of the rules as technologies develop and societal 
responses change. We can see how the wind blows in those quarters . 
Presently, Canadian researchers are working with existing 
embryonic stem cell lines, which provokes at least two further ethical 
questions. First, are we far enough removed from the derivation of the cells 
that the use of cell lines is permissible? Second, may we use discoveries 
gleaned from this research, particularly cures for serious illnesses? We can 
see that research on embryonic stem cells has implications for all of us, and 
we must be able to know what moral decisions to make. 
B. Ethical Issues Concerning Cloning 
Regarding cloning, Catholic teaching is clear that the procedure 
itself is immoral, since it separates the unitive and procreative aspects of 
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the marital act. This foundational teaching affects nearly every question 
raised by reproductive technology, and it is important to restate this as the 
primary reason why the Church teaches that all these procedures, including 
in vitro fertilization, are immoral. 
The use of cloned embryos is likewise forbidden. Arguments such as 
those raised recently by the former First Lady of the United States, Nancy 
Reagan, appealing for embryonic stem cell research using cells from any 
embryonic source, including clones, in the search for a cure for 
Alzheimer's, can obviously sway us in our attempts to relieve suffering. 
And who is not affected by the plight of the late Christopher Reeves, also 
pleading for a cure and asking scientists to use any means, including 
cloned embryos, to find cures for serious illnesses or conditions? Celebrity 
power is evident in many areas of life, and individual situations move us to 
compassion. It is difficult to maintain our ethical position, when most of 
society seems to be heading in a different direction. Nonetheless, we have 
a clear duty to do so. The basis for respect for the embryo, therefore, must 
be constantly restated by us. No matter what size, no matter what stage of 
development, a human embryo is to be treated as a person from 
conception. 
Other ethical issues arise concerning cloning, for example, the need 
for responsible conduct in research, since there have been many attempts at 
making clones by several rather charlatan groups. The World Health 
Organization has noted that 
... responsible biomedical researchers not only engage in thorough 
laboratory and animal studies before proceeding with human 
subjects, but also submit their work to scientific appraisal through 
open dissemination of their results in scientific meetil1£s and peer-
reviewed journals. Such transparency has been largely lacking in the 
reproductive cloning experiments announced so far. 
Another ethical issue is that a person's DNA could be used to create 
one or more clones, or copies, without that person's consent or even 
knowledge. Also, a cloned individual may suffer psychologically from 
being regarded as a "copy" of someone else, instead of experiencing the 
wonder of true individuality. The clone may also be constrained by 
expectations put upon him or her by virtue of being someone's "copy." 
The World Health Organization makes some pertinent remarks about 
the dignity of a clone. They claim that it is clear that an asexual mode of 
reproduction is "unnatural" for humans, since clones will not have two 
genetic parents, and family relationships could easily be distorted. It notes 
in a paragraph almost worthy of the Vatican that "cloning furthers an 
instrumental attitude towards human beings, that is, that persons exist to 
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serve purposes set by other people," and further, "cloning risks turning 
human beings into manufactured objects."(p.4) 
Overall, the World Health Orgaillzation takes the position that "the use 
of the replication of human individuals is ethically unacceptable and contrary 
to human dignity and integrity." It does not, however, carry this approach 
through to forbidding cloning to obtain stem cells. This same "disconnect" 
is made often. A recent editorial in a national newspaper states: "We accept 
in law the use of contraception in the form of the morning-after pill which 
effectively kills embryos. It is very difficult to make an argument against 
therapeutic cloning when it relies on spare eggs, a by-product of IVF 
treatment that would otherwise be destroyed or used for research. It will 
perhaps be five or ten years before scientists find out if the science works." 
These three sentences illustrate the mentality that views embryos, cloned 
or otherwise, as simply something to be used for others' benefit, with no 
question of their having any personal or moral status whatsoever. 
Despite the sentiments expressed by the World Health Organization, 
at least 67 national academies worldwide, including the United Kingdom's 
leading academic institution, the Royal Society, have urged the United 
Nations to ban the cloning of babies, i.e., reproductive cloning. Yet they 
make no ruling on prohibiting use of the same technology for making clones to 
be used as a source of stem cells for medical research. The United States is 
one of the few major powers pushing for a ban on both therapeutic and 
reproductive cloning. The Catholic Church has taken that stance since the 
beginning and continues to speak out against these practices. In a recent 
document called "Communion and Stewardship: Human Persons Created in 
the Image of God," issued in September, 2004, the International Theological 
Commission, headed by then Cardinal Ratzinger, said that " .. . human 
beings do not have 'a right of full disposal' over their biological natures." 
Rather, it continues, "The sovereignty we enjoy is not an unlimited one. We 
exercise a certain participated sovereignty over the created world and, in 
the end, we must render an account of our stewardship to the Lord of the 
universe." The document refers to areas where it considers the biological 
integrity of human beings may be threatened, and states clearly that human 
cloning is "an infringement of the person." 
III. Maya Catholic Institution Participate 
in Embryonic Stem Cell Research? 
The role of a Catholic health care institution can be difficult to 
determine at times and the moral imperative difficult to fulfill. The institution, 
in its pursuit of moral truth in the area of health care provision, must follow 
Catholic moral teaching. The local bishop, as pastor of the diocese, must 
ensure that institutional practice is in conformity with Church teaching. 
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Part of the work of a health care institution is research, an area which 
gives rise to many intricate moral questions. I know that there are Catholic 
hospitals which are asking whether it is moral to take part in research 
employing embryonic stem cells, but where existing stem cell lines only 
are involved. The ethics committees of the hospitals are quite clear that 
they accept the Church's teaching which states that an embryo is to be 
treated, from the moment of conception, as of equal dignity with every 
other human person. At the same time, they seem to have concluded that 
the use of embryonic stem cell lines established sometime beforehand does 
not contradict the dignity of the embryo. 
For our purposes here, I will consider three main questions only: 
Question 1: Is there a difference between making use of an 
embryo frozen as surplus to requirements for in vitro fertilization 
and making use of an embryo created for the purpose of research? 
Question 2: What cooperation in evil is involved in the matter of 
using embryonic stem cells from existing stem cell lines? 
Question 3: Maya Catholic institution offer a medical benefit or 
cure that has been derived from embryonic stem cell lines? 
My answers to these three questions are as follows: 
Question 1 answer: Whether the embryo is "spare" or "surplus," or 
whether it is created to derive stem cells from it, makes no difference to the 
essential moral response: Because of its moral status, its ltuman dignity, the 
embryo may not be used and, in this case, "use" actually means destruction 
of the embryo itself. 
Question 2 answer: Since stem cell lines already exist and are being used 
for research in other centers, does a Catholic institution have to distance 
itself completely from such use or, if it uses stem cell lines, would it be 
cooperating in evil? 
A. Cooperation in Evil 
I will here give a brief summary of the principles of cooperation in evil. 
Over a rather long period of time, the "rules of engagement" with 
respect to cooperating in the evil enacted by another have been worked out 
by moral theologians, involving a series of distinctions. Not all theologians 
are agreed on the precise meaning that should be given to the distinctions. 
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The primary distinction is that between formal and material cooperation. 
Formal cooperation consists in participation in the evil action and approval 
(reluctant or not) of the evil perpetrated by the principle agent. By 
definition, formal cooperation is always immoral. For example, a 
boyfriend supplies money for a private abortion so that both the mother and 
he may not be burdened with the consequences of having a child. 
There is a controversy as to whether cooperation may be implicit as 
well as explicit. A well-known Catholic philosopher, Germain Grisez, says 
that all formal cooperation is explicit, since it deals with intention. This 
accords, of course, with what Pope John Paul II talked of in Veritatis 
Splendor - "From the perspective of the acting person." What others 
consider implicit is either the result of deception (of self or others) or is the 
result of error. Other authors do admit to implicit formal cooperation, 
claiming that the difference between implicit formal cooperation and 
immediate material cooperation consists in the presence or absence of 
duress. It seems to me that the distinction is not helpful. If it can be shown 
that the cooperators through their own actions have to be in favor of the act 
of the principal agent, then the cooperation is formal, whether the 
cooperators declare themselves blameless or whether they are in error. 
Material cooperation implies some cooperation with the action itself, 
but without approval of the action. Material cooperation in evil is never a 
good thing in itself, of course, but sometimes it is morally permitted in our 
sinful world. Otherwise, life would be impossible. This kind of cooperation 
may be proximate or remote, where a more serious reason would be 
demanded the more proximate the cooperation is to the action itself. The 
notions of remote and proximate cooperation are not based entirely on 
temporal distance from the evil act but on the wider context. 
At this point, I would like to make another distincllion. One cannot 
cooperate with an action that has already taken place. One's own actions now 
have no bearing on the accomplishing of the evil act once completed. That 
does not mean, however, that one's present actions and intentions have no 
connection to the completed evil action. If one makes use of the results of 
the evil action, one is implicated somehow in the evil, sometimes remotely, 
sometimes more proximately. If one's present actions imply necessary 
approval of the evil action, one is guilty of complicity in the action. Here, 
complicity is closely connected to formal cooperation. If one's actions do not 
imply approval, one is simply implicated in the evil, perhaps justifiably so. 
There is an important aspect that is sometimes overlooked with respect 
to this whole discussion. The rules surrounding cooperation and complicity 
have been worked out from cases involving goods and evils. Over a period 
of time, however, it is possible that the rules take on a life of their own in 
people's minds, and reality is forced to comply with the rules and where the 
goods and evils involved receive lip service at best. For example, a nurse who 
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works in the operating theater of a hospital which performs abortions cannot 
simply deal with the rules of cooperation as set out in the works of authors. 
He or she should rather work from a valuing of human life and a honor of 
its destruction in the case of the most helpless human beings. His or her 
presence in the theater is a statement in itself about the disvaluing of life. 
Further, if one's actions are considered in isolation from the whole context, 
it can easily be forgotten that they help foster a social consciousness that is 
unconcerned with the value at stake. 
B. Catholic Hospitals and the Use of Stem Cell Lines 
Let's return to the second question. First, we should look at the use 
of embryonic stem cell lines in themselves, leaving aside questions of 
contribution to further killing of embryos and questions of scandal. If the 
question were set in a context of a ban on all further killing of embryos by 
anyone, then there could be disagreement as to whether compbcity is 
involved in the deaths of the embryos which gave rise to the stem cell lines 
or whether there is a more remote kind of impbcation in the evil which is 
able to be justified in terms of the great hope for cures. Theologians do in 
fact disagree about this question. 
The question, however, is abstract, because it is necessarily set in the 
present context of further killing of embryos for the sake of research. Even 
if the Catholic hospital researchers intend to restrict themselves to the use 
of stem cell lines resulting from past killing of embryos and will not be 
implicated in any further killing of embryos, their use of these stem cell lines 
implies complicity in the deaths of the early embryos, because the whole 
context here is the ongoing deaths of embryos for research. If you want to test 
this claim, substitute some other group of people who were killed because 
of their genetic makeup and the necessity of research. May il Catholic hospital 
use the biological material that came from these killings? May they do so 
when the killings continue and almost certainly will increase? The embryos 
were killed precisely to obtain their stem cells. (This is not incidental. It is 
a factor which essentially differentiates this procedure from the use of aborted 
fetuses, though this procedure is problematical in itself. The fetuses, though, 
were not aborted to provide biological material.) But since the embryos were 
killed precisely to develop stem cell lines, subsequent use of these stem 
cell lines is rather obviously complicity in the act of killing. The world 
context in which this complicity is taking place is a world where the fetus 
is killed for all sorts of reasons, frivolous or not, and where the embryo is 
considered simply a useful source of important biological matter. In these 
circumstances, compbcity by a respected Catholic institute of health care 
in the killing of embryos would be both gravely immoral and scandalous. 
There is a further abstraction implied in the question. There is an 
implied understanding that stem cell lines are stable enough to be useful 
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for ongoing and lengthy research. Recent research suggests that this is not 
the case. For the research to be valid, there will be need for more and more 
embryonic stem cells derived from more destroyed embryos. 
So far I have been speaking about complicity. I think that the use of 
these stem cell lines derived from past killings involves the researchers in 
cooperation also. It is not a matter of their cooperating in the past deaths of 
embryos, but of their cooperating in the present and future deaths of embryos. 
Remember that I am speaking here about researchers who are determined not 
to make use of stem cells other than those of stem cell lines established in the 
past from embryos killed precisely to obtain their stem cells. Even were they 
able to restrict themselves to the use of these stem cell lines, they would be 
part of a context where more and more people, experts and others, see the 
embryo simply as a wonderful source of biological matter that will provide 
for research which will result in cures for many ills. In other words, in 
terms of the whole picture, the hospitals would be cooperating with the 
present and future deaths of embryos. One may refer to this as material 
cooperation, but it would be proximate material cooperation because it is 
necessarily embedded in a context of ongoing unjust killing of embryos. 
The cures that may result from research on embryonic stem cells 
most probably will involve the insertion of embryonic stem cells into the 
patient. We know that vast numbers are needed in each case. To obtain 
these, more and more embryos will have to be killed. This certainly 
involves researchers in formal cooperation in the killing, when they are 
aware that their discovered cure demands more deaths. 
The reality of stem cell research at Catholic hospitals is that they 
have to be involved with more and more stem cell lines, even if they 
declare that they will use only stem cell lines from temporally distant 
killings. The simple fact is that they cannot restrict thems~lves to stem cell 
lines that are derived from killings of embryos which took place in the 
distant past. This being so, surely the hospitals cannot stand around with 
outstretched hands awaiting a new batch of cells, all the while quietly 
protesting their disapproval of the killings of the embryos. This is blatantly 
deceptive behavior. It involves complicity in the more recent deaths of 
the embryos and formal cooperation in their present and ongoing 
killing. (Some authors may refer to the latter as proximate material 
cooperation, which they consider to be immoral in the present case.) 
Moreover, in the case of grave evil, silence is not sufficient. The hospital 
should, if it disapproves of the killings, be doing all in its power to put an 
end to them, even if such an outcome is unlikely. 
Question 3, reiterated: Is a Catholic health care institution 
permitted morally to make use of a "cure" which was discovered by 
immoral means (i.e., through research involving embryonic stem cells)? 
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The answer depends partly on what the cure implies. 
A. First Possibility: If the cure demands the insertion in the patient of 
embryonic stem cells obtained precisely by killing the embryo for this 
purpose (which seems likely), then that cure should not be allowed in a 
Catholic institution. To employ the cure in this case would be formal 
cooperation in the killings of the embryos. 
B. Second Possibility: What, however, if the cure were to involve 
procedures based on embryonic stem cell research but which would not use 
further embryonic stem cells in the therapy in question? (This is 
hypothetical, since it does not apply at present.) Would the use of such a 
cure not fall under the "complicity argument" outlined above? This is a 
difficult question. Isn't knowledge, however it is obtained, part of the 
human heritage, and so able to be used for the betterment of people? 
Again, if we were to abstract from the actual situation and consider 
some hypothetical case, in which we abstract from the actual situation, in 
which the cure was discovered from the use of stem cell lines established in 
the past and where no further embryos are being killed, then an argument 
could be made for the use of the cure. In the actual situation, however, the 
discovery of the cure occurs in a context of ongoing experimentation on 
stem cells obtained by present killings of embryos and involves complicity 
in these killings. 
It is doubtful, though, if many people could understand this in a 
situation where they are presented with a method which could successfully 
treat their own illness or that of a loved one, and in a climate which is 
dismissive of the status of the embryo. In this case, I domot think that a 
Catholic institution should be compelled to avoid the use of such cures. 
There would have to be widespread intellectual and moral conversion with 
respect to the embryo and its status before discussion of the implications of 
employing such cures be attempted. I am aware that this way of thinking 
could help embed the immorality of killing embryos into the social and 
cultural fabric of society. On the other hand, by continually emphasizing 
the moral status of the embryo and by forbidding obvious formal 
cooperation in their deaths or complicity in their deaths, a firm statement 
will be made about the dignity of the embryo. With respect to the cures I 
have just spoken about, the faithful would be left in good faith on a matter 
which would seem to me to be beyond general understanding and general 
moral capacity. 
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Conclusion 
Let me summarize my position briefly: 
1. The climate is heavily pro-embryonic stem cell research. Attempts to 
oppose this research are often seen as the oddities of religious 
fundamentalists. 
2. On the premise that an embryo is a being with fully human status, direct 
killing of this person is immoral. Formal cooperation in these killings is 
immoral. 
3. The use of stem cell lines has to be considered in the context of the 
ongoing killing of embryos and involves, therefore, complicity in the 
deaths of the embryos which gave rise to the lines and formal cooperation 
in the ongoing killings of embryos, or, as some would argue, illicit material 
cooperation. This would be so even if the researchers in a particular case 
were to restrict their research to stem cell lines established in the relatively 
distant past. 
4. Since some stem cell lines are unstable, there will be a need to use more 
embryos to obtain new ones. Otherwise the research would be of doubtful 
validity. 
5. The employment of cures resulting from research on embryonic stem 
cells which involve the use of further embryonic stem cells is immoral. 
6. The use of cures which arose from embryonic stem cell research but 
which do not involve the use of embryonic stem cells is immoral in the 
present climate of ongoing killing of embryos to find cures. Official 
teaching on this matter, however, would require a wider recognition of the 
fully personal status of the embryo. 
7. I will end by emphasizing the difference between research on embryonic 
and adult stem cells. Success in the field of adult stem cells is a timely 
reminder that there are other ways for researchers to find cures for illnesses 
which allow for respect for the dignity of human embryos. 
306 Linacre Quarterly 
